Context: Why the question that we address is important
The canonical optimal control problem 0 = 0 � 1 0+ − 0+ * 2 + 2 0+ − * 2
=0
• The central bank can specify * • But * is an estimate of "normal" or "sustainable" activity… a concept like "potential output" or "the natural rate of unemployment" • Thus, the policymaker must, as part of the policy problem, estimate a latent variable defining the objective with respect to real activity • Typically, that latent variable is taken to be exogenous with respect to monetary policy-an assumption that we call into question • Various approaches to estimating y t *; we use a production-function approach Overview • A decomposition of each factor of production:
• A specification of the time-series behavior of cycle and trend cyc t = δ 1 cyc t-1 + δ 2 cyc t-2 + ξ t -Maybe the housing bust and financial fallout amounted to a big productivity shock
• But structural impairments to the production process seem limited -Maybe the return to investment has fallen markedly
• But if so, why are profits high?
• Overall assessment: Can't be certain, but an appreciable portion of the recent supply-side damage likely was endogenous. The damage would have been worse if policy had been less aggressive.
Endogenous supply-side damage motivates a strong countercyclical response
• Modify FRB/US model to incorporate calibrated hysteresis effects -Persistent slack causes U* to rise and LFPR* to fall nonlinearly -Policy cannot reverse damage but must wait for it to fade • Simulate a financial crisis under three different monetary policies:
-An inertial rule R t = .85R t-1 + .15{R*+ π t + 0.5[π t -π * ] + 1.0[y t -y t+j * ]} -An optimal control exercise that minimizes: 
Other considerations could rationalize policymaker restraint
• A very aggressive policy response could cause investors and others to increase leverage and reach for yield, thereby decreasing financial stability • Or a very aggressive policy response could cause an unmooring of inflation expectations that could be costly to stop -In contrast to endogenous supply-side damage, these risks pull policy responses in a more moderate direction • Uncertainty -All estimates of supply-side conditions are highly uncertain, as is the ability of monetary policy to influence those conditions -The likelihood and costs associated with endogenous financial instability and inflation expectations instability also highly uncertain • Depending on the weights they attach to these various considerations, policymakers will be more or less aggressive in response to a recession
